Introduction
This article examines the paradoxical question of whether the International Criminal Court will require justice at the expense of peace. Notwithstanding the popular catch phrase of the 1990s -"no peace without justice" ' -peace and justice are sometimes incompatible goals. To end an international or internal conflict, negotiations must often be conducted with the very leaders who were responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. When this is the case, insisting on criminal prosecutions can prolong the conflict, resulting in more death, destruction, and human suffering. Reflecting this reality, during the past several years, Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Uruguay, and South Africa have each granted amnesty to members of the former regime that committed international crimes within their respective borders as part of a peace arrangement. 3 With respect to four of these countries -Cambodia, E1 Salvador, Haiti, and South Africa -the United Nations pushed for, helped negotiate, and/or endorsed, the granting of amnesty as a means of restoring peace and democratic government. 4 The term "amnesty" derives from the Greek word "amnestia" -mean-ing "forgetfulness" or oblivion. 5 In the present context, amnesty refers to an act of sovereign power immunizing persons from criminal prosecution for past offenses. 6 At the preparatory conference for the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court in August 1997, the U.S. Delegation circulated a "nonpaper," which suggested that the proposed permanent court should take into account such amnesties in the interest of international peace and national reconciliation when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a situation or to prosecute a particular offender. 7 According to the U.S. text, the policies favoring prosecution of international offenders must be balanced against the need to close "a door on the conflict of a past era" and "to encourage the surrender or reincorporation of armed dissident groups," and thereby facilitate the transition to democracy. 8 While the U.S. proposal met with criticism from many quarters, the final text of the Rome Statute contains several ambiguous provisions which could be interpreted as codifying the U.S. proposal. This article examines the policies and legal issues related to recognizing an amnesty exception to the jurisdiction of a permanent international criminal court and analyzes whether the text of the Rome Statute should be read as embodying such an exception. This Article concludes that the existence of the International Criminal Court does not remove amnesty as a bargaining chip available to mediators attempting to bring an end to an international or internal conflict.
I. Practical Considerations

A. Interests Favoring Amnesty
As Payam Akhavan of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has observed, "it is not unusual in the political stage to see the metamorphosis of yesterday's war monger into today's peace broker." 9 Leaders of the various parties to a conflict must cooperate to put an end to the fighting and violations of international humanitarian law. Yet, it is unrealistic to expect such leaders to agree to a peace settlement if, directly following the agreement, they would find themselves or their close associates facing life imprisonment. Case studies in Haiti, South Africa, and the Dayton Accords demonstrate that the offer of amnesty may be a necessary bargaining chip to induce human rights violators to agree to peace and relinquish power. 10 
Haiti
From 1990 to 1994, Haiti was ruled by a military regime headed by General Raol Cedras and Brigadier General Philippe Biamby, which executed over 3000 civilian political opponents and tortured scores of others..' The United Nations mediated negotiations at Governors Island in New York Harbor, in which the military leaders agreed to relinquish power and permit the return of the democratically-elected civilian President (Jean-Bertrand Aristide) in return for full amnesty for the members of the regime and a lifting of the economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council.' 2 Under pressure from the United Nations mediators, Aristide agreed to the amnesty clause of the Governors Island Agreement.' 3 The U.N. Security Council immediately "declared [its] readiness to give the fullest possible support to the Agreement signed on Governors Island,"' 4 which it later said "constitutes the only valid framework for resolving the crisis in Haiti."' 5 When the military leaders initially failed to comply with the Governors Island Agreement, on July 31, 1994, the Security Council took the extreme step of authorizing an invasion of Haiti by a multinational force.' 6 On the eve of the invasion, General Cedras agreed to retire his command "when a general amnesty [was] 
South Africa
From 1960 to 1994, thousands of black South Africans were persecuted under that country's apartheid system. 19 With the prospect of a bloody civil war looming over negotiations, "[t]he outgoing leaders made some form of amnesty for those responsible for the regime a condition for the peaceful transfer to a fully democratic society. ' 20 The leaders of the majority black population decided that the commitment to grant amnesty was a fair price for a relatively peaceful transition to full democracy. 2 1 In accordance with the negotiated settlement between the major parties, on July 19, 1995, the South African Parliament created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, consisting of a Committee on Human Rights Violations, a Committee on Amnesty, and a Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation. 22 Under this process, amnesty would only be available to individuals who personally applied for it and who fully disclosed the facts of their apartheid crimes. 23 After conducting 140 public hearings and considering 20,000 written and oral submissions, the South African Truth Commission published a 2739-page report of its findings on October 29, 1998.24 Most observers believe the amnesty in South Africa headed off increasing tensions and a potential civil war. 
The Dayton Accords
As a counterpoint to these examples, commentators cite the successful negotiation of the Dayton Peace Accord, which required the parties of the Bosnian conflict to cooperate in the prosecution of offenders before an international tribunal. 26 The facts behind the Dayton Accord, however, suggest that "realpolitik" considerations once again prevailed over principles of justice. 27 On the eve of the Dayton talks, the Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Richard Goldstone, formally asked the United States to make the surrender of indicted suspects a condition for any peace accord. 2 8 The U.S. negotiators responded that they would not make such a condition a "show stopper" to the larger peace settlement. 2 9 While the accord ultimately contained several vague references to cooperating with the international tribunal, 30 it did not stipulate a role for the 60,000-strong NATO implementation force in apprehending indicted war criminals. As one of the Dayton negotiators confided, " [E] veryone who was at the Dayton proximity talks knew that if this issue was pressed it could have ruined the talks." 3 1 As a consequence, NATO argued first that it did not have the authority, and later that it did not have the mandate, to apprehend such persons.
3 2 Some nineteen months after the NATO deployment in Bosnia, the NATO troops began to arrest a handful of Serb warlords who were perceived as a threat to NATO's mission and security, but as of October 1999, the two most wanted indictees -Radovan Karadizic and Ratko Mladicremain at large in Bosnia. 
Amnesty Is Not Equivalent to Impunity
It is a common misconception that granting amnesty from prosecution is equivalent to foregoing accountability and redress. As the Haitian and South African situations indicate, amnesty is often tied to accountability mechanisms that are less invasive than domestic or international prosecution. Where amnesty has been traded for peace, the concerned governments have made monetary reparations to the victims and their families, established truth commissions to document the abuses (and sometimes identify perpetrators by name), and have instituted employment bans and purges (referred to as "lustration') that keep such perpetrators from positions of public trust. 38 While not the same as criminal prosecution, these mechanisms do encompass the fundamentals of a criminal justice system: prevention, deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation. 39 Indeed, some experts believe that these mechanisms do not just constitute "a second best approach" when prosecution is impracticable, but that in many situations they may be better suited to achieving the aims of justice.
B. The Benefits of Prosecution
Although providing amnesty may sometimes be necessary to achieve peace, there are important considerations favoring prosecution that suggest amnesty should be a bargaining tool of last resort reserved only for extreme situations. In particular, prosecuting persons responsible for violations of international humanitarian law can serve to discourage future human rights abuses, deter vigilante justice, and reinforce respect for law and the new democratic government.
While prosecutions might initially provoke resistance, some analysts believe that national reconciliation cannot take place as long as justice is foreclosed. 41 As Professor Cherif Bassiouni, Chairman of the U.N. Investigative Commission for Yugoslavia, has stated, "if peace is not intended to be a brief interlude between conflicts," then it must be accompanied by justice. amnesty or de facto impunity has led to an increase in abuses in those countries. 44 What a new or reinstated democracy needs most is legitimacy, which requires a fair, credible and transparent account of what took place and who was responsible. Criminal trials (especially those involving proof of widespread and systematic abuses) can generate a comprehensive record of the nature and extent of violations: how they were planned and executed, the fate of individual victims, and who gave the orders and who carried them out. While there are various means to develop the historic record of such abuses, the most authoritative rendering of the truth is only possible through a trial that accords full due process. Supreme CourtJustice Robert Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor at Niirnberg, underscored the logic of this proposition when he reported that the most important legacy of the Nurnberg trial was the documentation of Nazi atrocities "with such authenticity and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future." 45 According to Jackson, the establishment of an authoritative record of abuses that would endure the test of time and withstand the challenge of revisionism required proof "of incredible events by credible evidence."
In addition to truth, there is a responsibility to provide justice. While a state may appropriately forgive crimes (such as treason or sedition) against itself, serious crimes against persons (such as rape and murder) are an altogether different matter. A state may owe a duty to the victims and their families to hold violators accountable for their acts. Prosecuting and punishing the violators would give significance to the victims' suffering and serve as partial remedy for their injuries. Moreover, prosecutions help restore victims' dignity and prevent private acts of revenge by those who, in the absence of justice, may take it into their own hands.
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While prosecution and punishment can reinforce the value of law by displacing personal revenge, failure to punish former leaders responsible for widespread human rights abuses encourages cynicism about the rule of law and distrust toward the political system. To the victims of human rights crimes, amnesty represents the ultimate in hypocrisy: while victims struggle to put their suffering behind them, those responsible are allowed to enjoy a comfortable retirement. When those with power are seen to be above the law, the ordinary citizen will find it difficult to believe in the 44 principle of the rule of law as a fundamental necessity in a democratic country.
Finally, where international organizations give their imprimatur to amnesty, there is a risk that rogue regimes in other parts of the world will be encouraged to engage in gross abuses. For example, history records that the international amnesty given to the Turkish officials responsible for the massacre of over one million Armenians during World War I encouraged Adolf Hitler some twenty years later to conclude that Germany could pursue his genocidal policies with impunity. 48 In a 1939 speech to his reluctant General Staff, Hider remarked, "Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians?" 4 9 Richard Goldstone, former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, has concluded that the failure of the international community to prosecute Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein, and Mohammed Aidid, among others, encouraged the Serbs to launch their policy of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia with the expectation that they would not be held accountable for their international crimes.
5 0 When the international community encourages or endorses amnesty for human rights abuses, it sends a signal to other rogue regimes that they have nothing to lose by instituting repressive measures. Such regimes can always bargain away their crimes by agreeing to peace.
II. The Limited International Legal Obligation to Prosecute
In a few narrowly defined situations, there is an international legal obligation to prosecute regardless of the underlying practical considerations. An amnesty given to the members of a former regime could be invalidated in a proceeding before either the state's domestic courts 5 1 or an international forum.
5 2 It would be inappropriate for an international criminal court to defer to a national amnesty in a situation where the amnesty violates obli- conventions that dearly provide a duty to prosecute humanitarian or human rights crimes defined therein, including in particular the "grave breaches" provisions of the'1949 Geneva Conventions, 5 5 and the Genocide Convention.
5 6 When these Conventions are applicable, the granting of amnesty to persons responsible for committing the crimes defined therein would constitute a breach of a treaty obligation for which there can be no excuse or exception. 5 7 It is important to recognize, however, that these Conventions were negotiated in the context of the cold war and by design apply only to a narrow range of situations.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions codified the international rules relating to the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territory. 5 8 Almost every country of the world is party to these conventions. Each of the Geneva Conventions contains a specific enumeration of grave breaches, which are war crimes under international law for which there is individual criminal liability and for which states have a corresponding duty to prosecute or extradite. 60 Grave breaches include willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, extensive destruction of property not justified by military necessity, wilfully depriving a civilian of the rights of fair and reg- Parties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to search for, prosecute and punish perpetrators of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions unless they choose to hand over such persons for trial by another state party. 63 The Commentary to the Geneva Conventions, which is the official history of the negotiations leading to the adoption of these treaties, confirms that the obligation to prosecute Grave Breaches is "absolute," meaning, inter alia, that States Parties can under no circumstances grant perpetrators immunity or amnesty from prosecution for grave breaches of the Conventions.
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It is important to recognize that there is no corresponding obligation to prosecute with respect to "other violations of the laws and customs of war" applicable in international armed conflicts, as listed in Article 8, subsection (2)(b) of the Rome Statute. 6 5 In addition, while states or international tribunals may prosecute persons who commit war crimes in internal armed conflicts (see Article 8, subsections (2)(c) and (2) 70. Article 4 of the Genocide Convention states: "Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are consti-Both the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute define genocide as one of the following acts when committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such": (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
1
There are several important limitations inherent in this definition. First, to constitute genocide, there must be proof that abuses were committed with the specific intent required by the Genocide Convention. 72 It is not enough that abuses were intended to repress opposition-the intent must be literally to destroy the opposition. 73 Second, and even more importantly, the victims of such abuses must constitute one of the four specific groups enumerated in the Genocide Convention, namely, national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. 74 In this respect, it is noteworthy that the drafters of the Genocide Convention deliberately excluded acts directed against "political groups" from the Convention's definition of genocide. enumerated therein. There is growing recognition that the duty to ensure rights implies a duty to hold specific violators accountable.
B. General Human Rights Conventions
79
A careful examination of the jurisprudence of the bodies responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the conventions suggests that methods of obtaining specific accountability other than criminal prosecutions would meet the requirement of "ensuring rights."
8 0 This jurisprudence indicates that a state must fulfill five obligations in confronting gross violations of human rights committed by a previous regime. States must (1) investigate the identity, fate and whereabouts of victims; (2) investigate the identity of major perpetrators; (3) provide reparation or compensation to victims; (4) take affirmative steps to ensure that human rights abuse does not recur; and (5) punish those guilty of human rights abuse. 81 Punishment can take many non-criminal forms, including imposition of fines, removal from office, reduction of rank, and forfeiture of government or military pensions and/or other assets. (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
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Unlike grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the crime of genocide, no treaty exists requiring states to prosecute crimes against humanity, which are purely a creature of customary international law. 8 4 Traditionally, those who committed crimes against humanity were treated like pirates, as hostes humani generis (an enemy of all humankind), 85 and any state, including their own, could punish them through its domestic courts. 8 6 In the absence of a treaty containing the aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) principle, this so called "universal jurisdiction" is generally thought to be permissive, not mandatory.
8 7 Yet, several commentators and human rights groups have recently taken the position that customary international law not only establishes permissive jurisdiction over perpetrators of crimes against humanity, but also requires their prosecution and prohibits amnesty for such persons.
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There are strong jurisprudential reasons for recognizing such a rule. The perpetrator of crimes against humanity incurs criminal responsibility and is subject to punishment as a direct consequence of international law notwithstanding the national laws of any state or states to the contrary. 89 This unique characteristic of crimes under international law makes it questionable whether any state or group of states would be competent to negate this responsibility. Moreover, the notion of granting amnesty for crimes against humanity would be inconsistent with the principles of individual criminal responsibility recognized in the Niirnberg Charter and Judgment. The fundamental purpose of these principles is to remove any possibility of immunity for persons responsible for such crimes, from the most junior officer acting under the orders of his superior, to the most senior government officials, including the head of state.
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Notwithstanding these jurisprudential justifications, there is scant evidence that customary international law requires the prosecution of crimes against humanity. Customary international law, which is just as binding hortative declarations of international conferences, 94 and international conventions that are not widely ratified, 95 Even if the Convention was more widely ratified, the prohibition on applying a statute of limitations to crimes against humanity is not the equivalent of a duty to prosecute such crimes.
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earliest international recognition 9 6 of a legal obligation to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The Declaration provides that states shall not grant asylum to any "person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a . . . crime against humanity." 97 Yet, according to the historic record of this resolution, "[t]he majority of members stressed that the draft declaration under consideration was not intended to propound legal norms or to change existing rules of international law, but to lay down broad humanitarian and moral principles upon which States might rely in seeking to unify their practices relating to asylum." 9 8 This demonstrates that, from the outset, the General Assembly resolutions concerning crimes against humanity were not intended to create any binding duties.
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In addition to this contrary legislative history, the problem with an approach which bases the existence of customary international law so heavily on words rather than deeds is "that it is grown like a flower in a hot-house and that it is anything but sure that such creatures will survive in the much rougher climate of actual state practice." 10 0 To the extent that any state practice in this area is widespread, it is the practice of granting amnesties or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes against humanity.
1 1 That the United Nations itself has felt free of legal constraints in endorsing amnesty for peace deals confirms that customary international has not yet crystallized in this area. 
III. Amnesty and the Rome Statute
The preceding discussion indicates that there are frequently no international legal constraints to the negotiation of an amnesty for peace deal. Moreover, swapping amnesty for peace can serve the interests of both peace and justice in certain circumstances. During the Rome Statute negotiations, the United States and a few other delegations expressed concern that the International Criminal Court would hamper efforts to halt human rights violations and restore peace and democracy in places like Haiti and South Africa. The Preamble's language is important because international law provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." 10 9 Thus, the Preamble constitutes a critical source of interpretation because it indicates both the treaty's context and its object and purpose. Yet, notwithstanding this language, there are several articles of the Rome Statute 1 0 that might be read as permitting the Court under certain circumstances to recognize an amnesty exception to its jurisdiction."' The apparent conflict between these Articles and the Preamble reflect the schizophrenic nature of the negotiations at Rome: the preambular language and the procedural provisions were negotiated by entirely different drafting groups, and in the rush of the closing days of the Rome Conference, the Drafting Committee never fully integrated and reconciled the separate portions of the Statute. Accordingly, the nature of the charges might constitute a significant factor to be considered, but would not necessarily be a bar to recognizing an amnesty.
C. Article 53: Prosecutorial Discretion Where the Security Council has not requested the International Criminal Court to respect an amnesty-for-peace deal and thereby to terminate a prosecution, the Court's Prosecutor may nevertheless choose to do so under Article 53 of the Rome Statute. 12 1 That Article permits the Prosecutor to decline to initiate an investigation (even when a state party has filed a complaint) where the Prosecutor concludes there are "substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice." 1 2 2 However, the decision of the Prosecutor under Article 53 is subject to review by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court. 12 3 In reviewing whether respecting an amnesty and not prosecuting would better serve "the interests of justice," the Pre-Trial Chamber would have to evaluate the benefits of a particular amnesty and consider whether there is an international legal obligation to prosecute the offense. 1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: (c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his or her determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber. Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 53.
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ute. 12 5 Article 17(l)(a) requires the Court to dismiss a case where "the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." 12 6 It is significant that the Article requires an investigation but does not specify a criminal investigation. 127 The concerned state could argue that a truth commission (especially one modeled on that of South Africa) constitutes a genuine investigation. 128 On the other hand, subsection (2) of the Article suggests that the standard for determining that an investigation is not genuine is whether the proceedings are "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice" 12 9 -a phrase which might be interpreted as requiring criminal proceedings.
E. Article 20: Ne Bis In Idem
Finally, the accused can attempt to raise the issue under Article 20, which codifies the ne bis in idem principle. 130 Article 20 provides:
No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under [the jurisdiction of the international criminal court] shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other Court: (a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
13 1
Relying on this provision, the accused could argue that his or her confession before a truth commission, and any attendant penalties, is the functional equivalent of having been tried and convicted for the same offense that he or she is charged with by the International Criminal Court. There are two problems with this argument, however. First, the provision speaks of trial by "another court," and a truth commission is not a court; second, as with Article 17, Article 20 is not applicable to proceedings "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice."1 32
Conclusion
David J. Scheffer, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues has remarked that "one must understand that amnesty is always on the Has the State implemented meaningful steps to ensure that violations of international humanitarian law and serious human rights abuses do not recur? (6) Has the State taken steps to punish those guilty of committing violations of international humanitarian law through non-criminal sanctions, such as imposition of fines, removal from office, reduction of rank, and forfeiture of government or military pensions and/or other assets? 140 Even where the answers to the above questions suggest that the particular amnesty arrangement serves both the interests of peace and justice, the International Criminal Court should defer prosecution only in the most compelling of cases in light of its core purpose as reflected in the Preamble to the Rome Statute. 
